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Electronic markets have been a core topic of information systems (IS) research for last three decades. Wefocus on a more recent phenomenon: smart markets. This phenomenon is starting to draw considerable
interdisciplinary attention from the researchers in computer science, operations research, and economics com-
munities. The objective of this commentary is to identify and outline fruitful research areas where IS researchers
can provide valuable contributions. The idea of smart markets revolves around using theoretically supported
computational tools to both understand the characteristics of complex trading environments and multiechelon
markets and help human decision makers make real-time decisions in these complex environments. We out-
line the research opportunities for complex trading environments primarily from the perspective of design of
computational tools to analyze individual market organization and provide decision support in these complex
environments. In addition, we present broad research opportunities that computational platforms can provide,
including implications for policy and regulatory research.
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1. Introduction
The increase in computational power, advances in
user interface design, and the fluidity of electronic
communication with the advent and growth of the
Internet have realized many of the theoretical con-
jectures that originated from the seminal article by
Malone et al. (1987). The research in computer science,
economics, management, and information science is
trying to push the envelope on market structure, orga-
nization, design, and decision support in increasingly
complex and codependent markets in which mod-
ern organizations operate. The term smart markets has
been used in management science (McCabe et al.
1991, Gallien and Wein 2005) to refer to optimization-
based markets. We want to generalize this idea and
focus on interactive market design, respective deci-
sion support, and computational tools to increase the
efficiency and robustness of individual smart markets.
Our primary focus is on anticipating market needs
at various levels so that decision makers such as
regulators, manufacturers, and customers are armed
with appropriate tools and information to make the
best possible decisions. Rapid advances in compu-
tational power and evolution of computer networks
have enabled the researchers to design complex mar-
ket structures where computational intelligence is desir-
able to facilitate human decision making. Examples
of smart markets or need for synthetic intelligence
exist in several markets, such as energy markets,
online retailing and negotiations, and FCC spectrum
auctions.
The smart markets research that we consider refers
to this latter perspective. Smart markets require a
wide spectrum of research from optimization tech-
niques to game theoretic formulations, as well as
research on individual behavior and preferences to
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market mechanism and even organizational design.
A wide array of methodological developments, from
new statistical methodologies to artificial intelligence
techniques, also need to take place. In addition, com-
putational research platforms that can model a vari-
ety of complex business and economic environments
need to be developed. These platforms facilitate
exploration of multiechelon systems to study embed-
ded endogenous relationships in a holistic manner.
Computational research platforms also facilitate antic-
ipation of market needs at a variety of different lev-
els of coarseness so that decision makers such as
regulators, sellers, and buyers could be armed with
appropriate tools and information to make the best
possible decisions, ultimately increasing allocative
efficiency of markets and welfare. These approaches
have been adopted in many other academic fields
(such as social sciences, engineering, and economics)
to study phenomena that have been shown to be dif-
ficult to analyze analytically. We argue that computa-
tional platforms should also be used by information
systems (IS) researchers to study electronic market
design issues as a complement to pure mathematical
models and lab experiments. The purpose of this com-
mentary is to draw attention to a set of particularly
fruitful potential areas of research inquiries to which
IS researchers can make significant contributions and,
therefore, should be involved in setting the direction
and research agenda for this stream of research.
For a commentary in an emerging area and for
brevity, it is important to define the boundaries of
what we are focusing on and why. Smartness, by def-
inition, requires intelligence. Therefore, we first define
what we mean by intelligence in the context of market
design, platform design, and the design of associated
decision support tools that form the basic building
blocks of smart markets. Note that because our inter-
est is in defining intelligence derived via the use of
computing tools, we focus primarily on what could
be termed as computational intelligence. However,
for expository purposes, in the rest of the docu-
ment we simply refer to computational intelligence
as intelligence. We divide intelligence into two broad
categories: (i) instantaneous or real-time intelligence
that is used primarily by individual or atomic enti-
ties in individual markets and (ii) collective intelli-
gence that refers to market-level intelligence where
several atomic entities across markets interact with
each other.
The need for instantaneous or real-time intelligence
typically arises in dynamic markets where uncer-
tainty in supply, demand, quantity, quality, etc. creates
complex utility functions in multiple dimensions.
New multiobject auction designs, such as combinato-
rial auctions, provide an example for smart market
designs where new bidding languages and opti-
mization have led to numerous new research ques-
tions in the past few years (Cramton et al. 2006).
In such environments, it is often difficult to even
express the preferences over the complex decision set
adequately, leave alone make a decision. Obviously,
increased computational power and improved algo-
rithms for optimal decision making have made sig-
nificant progress over the decades, and we can solve
problems in seconds that might have taken days only
a decade ago. However, the markets have evolved as
well, and decision makers are now forced into more
diverse markets with more complex rules and condi-
tions, making it difficult to use the information that
might indeed be available or computable. A prime
example of failures of such markets (or exploitation of
complex markets due to the difficulty in comprehend-
ing its operational rules) was California’s electricity
market crisis in 2000–2001, with disastrous impact
on both the state and companies involved in trading
the electricity. In §2, we review the significant strides
made in this area and a vast array of open research
questions that need to be addressed for creating a
higher level of domain centric real-time intelligence.
The collective intelligence refers to developing an
understanding of complex relationships in any multi-
echelon ecosystem of codependent and coevolving
markets, such as end-to-end supply chains in a com-
petitive market. The enhanced computational pow-
ers, open programming paradigms, and advances in
multiagent systems research have opened up unprece-
dented opportunities to study whole ecosystems. The
study of these ecosystems provides opportunities
to use “neo-Schumpertarian economics” to under-
stand the role of technology and industry structure
to explain the evolution of market structures and
dynamics of industry change in today’s knowledge-
based economy (Hanusch and Pyka 2007). Develop-
ing open, research-oriented computational platforms
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has a great promise to facilitate simulation studies
at industry level and, as several events in finan-
cial markets around the world since 2007 have high-
lighted, studies to develop appropriate policy and
regulatory frameworks. The Trading Agent Compe-
tition (http://www.tradingagents.org) is one exam-
ple of such a computational platform and simulation
environment. Computational platforms can also pro-
vide an ideal vehicle to study dynamics of compe-
tition and strategy at micro level by allowing inte-
gration of independent software agents (acting as,
for example, firms) to study and validate theoretical
results and explore complex economies that cannot
yet be analyzed analytically or can be analyzed only
with strong and unrealistic assumptions.
In addition, platforms provide ideal environments
to one of the thorniest issues in customization and
market segmentation—the estimation of consumer
preferences—because the ability to test approaches
for estimating consumer preferences can be tested
against actual preferences that are mathematically or
probabilistically defined. The set of research oppor-
tunities in this domain are numerous and, with the
opportunities to easily develop plug-and-play com-
putational agents, provide an exciting avenue of
research opportunity to IS researchers. We discuss
these opportunities in §3.
Finally, §4 concludes this commentary with
thoughts on the broad set of methodological tools and
expertise that can contribute and indeed is desirable,
making this research area very exciting.
2. Research Opportunities in
Real-Time Intelligence for
Smart Markets
As mentioned earlier, the need for real-time intel-
ligence arises in dynamic markets with significant
uncertainty about demand and supply. These mar-
kets often employ auctions to agree to terms and con-
ditions of a trade. Traditionally, these mechanisms
have been studied by using classical game theory and
mechanism design, where issues of equilibrium (to
ensure efficient outcomes) and incentive compatibility
have dominated the theoretical concerns. However,
practical smart markets require explicit considera-
tion of computational aspects. This insight has led
to many new insights at the intersection of com-
puter science, economic theory, operations research,
and information systems. For example, algorithmic
mechanism design combines ideas such as utility max-
imization and mechanism design from economics by
considering computational constraints to be of cen-
tral importance for viable economic mechanisms, but
at the same time aims for incentive compatibility
(Vazirani et al. 2007). IS researchers have considered
design enhancements in online auctions by consider-
ing actual strategies used by real participants (Bapna
et al. 2004) or evaluated different pricing concepts in
combinatorial auctions (Bichler et al. 2009). Even in
the traditional posted price environments, a seller can
use real-time intelligence to dynamically set prices
based on consumers’ willingness to pay (Bapna et al.
2008). However, for brevity, in the rest of this sec-
tion, for expository purposes we discuss the research
opportunities in traditional dynamic markets (i.e.,
auction-like environments).
There are numerous research opportunities for IS
researchers in the domain of providing real-time
intelligence and capability in design. The primary
issue from the bidders’ perspective is the ability
to formulate and express their bidding preferences
appropriately. This is a nontrivial task in complex auc-
tions on multiple attributes, multiple units, or items
where auctioneers might have incentives to provide
limited information and/or the informational envi-
ronment does not afford the quality of information
that bidders can use effectively (Adomavicius et al.
2009). Conversely, the issues for auctioneers revolve
around: (i) what information should be revealed, and
(ii) what should be the format of a given auction
and what should be specific rules of engagement in a
given mechanism (e.g., as Bapna et al. 2004 discuss,
in online multiunit auctions a variety of rules exists
to prioritize the bids at a given bid level). In §§2.1
and 2.2 we discuss each of these research opportuni-
ties in more detail.
2.1. Intelligence for Bidders’ Decision Making
Broadly, the problem of providing intelligent support
for bidders, for a given mechanism, can be divided in
two parts: (i) expressing their multidimensional pref-
erences as bids, as opposed to primarily price-based
bidding, and (ii) the ability to reasonably accurately
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predict future state of the auction to understand the
quality of their own bids (e.g., how their own bid
compares to ending price prediction).
2.1.1. Expressing Complex Preferences. The In-
ternet brought about a large set of innovations
and provided bidders the ability to express and
exchange information about their preferences in mul-
tiple dimensions such as multiple items, multiple
units, and possibly multiple attributes of a good or
service to be traded in real time. Developing more
expressive and yet simple bidding languages is an
open research area by using functions or logic for-
malisms for bidders to describe their preferences in a
compact manner. Such bid languages can better match
buyers and sellers and consequently create higher
allocative efficiency. However, this leads to hard opti-
mization problems, and auctioneers as well as bidders
need decision support to harness the new possibili-
ties of such markets. Therefore, such research involves
multidisciplinary research teams and solutions to cre-
ate better bidding languages and new mechanism
designs.
Combinatorial auctions are an important type of
mechanism that highlights many of the challenges
associated with requirements of intelligence for bid-
der and auctioneer support. Instead of auctioning
multiple items in a sequence or in parallel, combi-
natorial auctions (CAs) allow for bids on bundles
of items. Theory and experimental evidence suggest
that this can lead to significantly increased efficiency
in the case of synergies among items. While many
current combinatorial auction implementations are
not smart markets, there is a need for intelligence
tools in these markets to facilitate better bidding
and create higher efficiencies. Many traditional chal-
lenges associated with these types of auctions (such
as winner determination) have been mitigated with
the enhanced computational capabilities and innova-
tive solution techniques to create many real-world
applications such as transportation or procurement
(Cramton et al. 2006). However, the bidders’ prob-
lems and need for real-time intelligence still remains a
big challenge. These challenges arise for the following
reasons:
• A bidder needs to determine their valuations
for 2n − 1 bundles, where n is the number of items
for sale. As an example, this would require elici-
tation of 1,023 valuations for an auction with only
10 items of interest. This could be thought of as valu-
ation complexity.
• Even if the bidders knew their valuations, they
would still need to decide how to respond during an
auction; for example, when and how much to bid.
This can be thought of as strategic complexity.
Ideally, research focusing on different auction rules
that reduce strategic complexity for bidders is highly
desirable along with the need to provide adequate
bidding languages and user interfaces to express
complex preferences. IS researchers can contribute
to both these research streams with their experi-
ence in measuring and calibrating electronic sys-
tems usage. Bidding languages can exploit parameter
space of a trading environment by explicitly allow-
ing the users to represent their preferences; while
there have been individual papers on computational
aspects of volume discount auctions or multi-attribute
auctions (Bichler and Kalagnanam 2005, Goossens
et al. 2007), there is little work on optimal configu-
ration of the parameter space and what information
should be included or excluded under different mar-
ket conditions. Much more research is required on
knowledge representation for different types of mar-
kets and respective smart market designs. Clearly, IS
researchers have a lot to contribute in this vibrant area
of research.
2.1.2. Understanding Bid Quality. Traditionally,
game theory has been used to analytically derive
optimal strategies for participants in interactive envi-
ronments. However, for most auction formats no
dominant strategy equilibria exist; therefore, bidders
can at best speculate on other bidders’ valuations or
strategies. Understanding his or her own bid quality
is essential for a bidder to place a good quality bid.
Judging the quality of a bid becomes a challenging
task when the information regarding the mechanism
is hard to grasp due to mechanism complexity (e.g.,
iterative combinatorial auctions where even the reve-
lation of other bidders’ bids does not necessarily ease
the burden on a given bidder) or information rele-
vant for making a bidding decision is purposefully
withheld, as is often the case in procurement auctions
where information regarding exact bids might not
be provided even in a multi-round iterative auction
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(e.g., Muni auctions at http://www.grantstreet.com/).
IS researchers can develop tools that can support and
help bidders in evaluating their bid quality. For exam-
ple, Adomavicius et al. (2009) provide an interesting
computational approach in an opaque auction for bid-
ders to be able to probabilistically estimate a winning
bid based on their risk profile. Similar tools can pro-
vide bidders a better estimate of valuable informa-
tion, such as their surplus and winning probability in
complex auction and negotiation environments.
IS researchers are already using a variety of tools,
such as multi-agent systems and simulations, Monte
Carlo and discrete event simulations (e.g., Scheffel
et al. 2010), and computational strategy design
(Greenwald et al. 2010). However, the area is in its
infancy, and significantly more creative research is
needed in the area.
2.2. Intelligence for Auctioneers’ Design Choices
In addition to combinatorial auctions there have been
several contributions on other types of smart mar-
kets that allow for volume discount bids or multi-
attribute bids. Overall, surprisingly little is known
about the design and bidding behavior in these smart
markets. A number of fundamental results on equi-
librium strategies for selected auction formats, often
with strong restrictions on the types of valuations, are
negative in the sense that the assumptions for fully
efficient mechanisms with a strong game-theoretical
solution concept do not typically hold in practical
applications. Both research that is based on data from
the field and experimental research show that bidders
do not necessarily follow optimal strategies as pre-
dicted by game-theoretical models (Bapna et al. 2003,
Scheffel et al. 2010).
While there is a significant body of theoretical and
experimental literature on price-only auctions, the lit-
erature on the empirical and behavioral work on com-
plex auctions and other types of smart markets is
scarce to say the least. While IS researchers have done
some work on decision support tools using alterna-
tive feedback mechanisms in combinatorial auctions
(Adomavicius and Gupta 2005) or choice of appropri-
ate bid-increment and prediction of future states of
the auction in multi-unit auctions (Bapna et al. 2003,
2008), this literature is in its infancy. A significantly
higher amount of research needs to be conducted in
the area of design choices available to an auctioneer
and its impact on behavioral and economic proper-
ties of the mechanism using experimental, computa-
tional, and simulation-based approaches in addition
to theoretical analyses. An example of such research
is the experimental work by Scheffel et al. (2010), who
show that with linear competitive equilibrium prices
a high level of efficiencies can be achieved, even
when theoretically no such prediction can be made.
IS researchers can also contribute a great amount on
participant behavior, antecedents of these behaviors,
and moderating and mediating effects of mechanism
design choices on these behaviors.
While the research on real-time intelligence for
smart markets is exciting and provides significant
research opportunities, in the next section we dis-
cuss research opportunities using computational plat-
forms that provide an even wider array of promising
research opportunities for IS researchers in the dimen-
sions of policy and regulatory research and the holy
grail of computational research for the smart mar-
ket research—the estimation of consumer preferences
and its usage in business decision making. Note that
significant research opportunities for real-time intel-
ligence exist with computational platforms as well.
For example, computational research platforms for
Trading Agent Competition for Travel1 is used for
optimizing the product configuration based on par-
tially observable customer demand. Similarly, Trading
Agent Competition for Supply Chain Management
provides opportunities for research in sourcing and
dynamic inventory management decisions. However,
the next section focuses primarily on market-level
intelligence in the presence of several competitors that
can be thought of as atomic agents.
3. Operational and Collective
Intelligence
Much of the research on mechanism design has
focused on the design of a single isolated event.
The analysis of multiple interdependent markets and
supply chains turns out to be much more diffi-
cult. Neoclassical general equilibrium models have
been criticized for having unrealistic assumptions
1 See http://www.tradingagents.org.
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unsuitable for analyzing participant behavior and effi-
ciency of real markets. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, computational platforms and computational
experiments can provide significant new opportuni-
ties for IS research in exploring a range of inter-
esting and complex problem domains that are both
socially and economically important. Computational
platforms provide feature-rich and flexible research
environments that are low risk, holistic laboratory
platforms for developing an understanding of the
emergent phenomena arising from complex inter-
actions of market mechanisms with adaptive, self-
interested agents, under any technical and economic
constraints that future smart markets may impose.
These platforms can help us understand the interplay
of smart markets and better quantify the symbiotic
relationships among various market participants in
the dynamic multiechelon economy.
These platforms and tools become possible through
the emergence of new, previously unavailable large-
scale computational power such as cloud and grid
computing. Applied computer scientists have already
designed some platforms that have become the focus
of research, with competitions being organized to bring
the research community together and to test the effi-
cacy of both computational and strategic research
ideas in a given domain (www.tradingagents.org).
Researchers have observed that these platforms and
associated competitions have been an effective way
to spur innovation (Kearns and Ortiz 2003). On the
macro level, these platforms are able to provide clear
guidance for policymakers on the capabilities and
limitations of open market structures for management
of future smart markets in a given domain. On the
other hand, individual agents (firms) can use these to
learn, create, and test short- and long-term strategies
using available information from the overall business
ecosystem. The participants in these competitions
need to design techniques to manage risk and adapt
to changing conditions while concurrently trading in
multiple markets. It is hard to do experiments with
real organizations, but these experimental platforms
provide a powerful vehicle for evaluation and vali-
dation of new and creative ideas. Organized compe-
titions such as trading agent competition for supply
chain management (TAC SCM) (Collins et al. 2010),
and Power TAC2 (Ketter et al. 2010), along with many
related tools, are driving research into a range of inter-
esting and complex domains that are both socially
and economically important. Because such experi-
mental markets allow market structures to be evalu-
ated under a variety of real-world conditions under
competitive pressures, these platforms can also be
used to effectively uncover potential hazards of pro-
posed market designs in the face of strategic behav-
iors on the part of the participating agents, helping
policy makers in policy and regulation design. For
instance, there were multiple opportunities for agents
to manipulate the game in unintended ways (Ketter
et al. 2004). Similar phenomena can be observed in
real-world supply chains, where certain policies can
be an advantage to some suppliers and lead to unin-
tended long-term effects on the market.
Multiechelon markets, such as supply chains,
should not be viewed as monolithic entities that can
be centrally optimized, but instead consist of multi-
ple self-interested entities each operating according
to its own objectives and policies. For example,
while each real-world supply chain exhibits its
own peculiarities, we need platforms that capture
major sources of complexity common to many sup-
ply chains, shielding researchers from less relevant
idiosyncrasies. IS researchers should become central
players in designing these platforms and the entities
around these platforms. Smart market entities could
be modeled as autonomous agents that concurrently
compete with each other in environments that are
subject to both exogenous and endogenous sources
of uncertainty. These platforms reflect many desirable
characteristics of the real world because agents act
autonomously to maximize their expected utilities in
an environment that is highly dynamic, with only par-
tially observable parameters, and strongly affected by
competitive forces.
3.1. Management and Control of
Platform Mechanisms
There are numerous research questions regarding
operational and collective intelligence that can be
answered with the help of these computational plat-
forms; however, due to space limitations we focus
2 See http://www.powertac.org.
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only on the important questions of policy and regula-
tory recommendations, as well as on the coordination
among different markets.
3.1.1. Policy and Regulatory Recommendations.
Platform-based research will allow exploration of
policy and regulatory recommendations for existing
and emerging markets—an area that has lacked any
serious research efforts beyond rhetorical debates.
Researchers can generate an improved understand-
ing of technology-based markets and interactions to
inform policymakers regarding the capabilities and
limitations of open market structures because the
problems in such markets are about to become even
more complex. As the devastating and unintended
consequences of the California energy crisis of 2000
and 2001 highlighted, the agents in any trading envi-
ronment will try to exploit mechanisms weaknesses in
an unintended manner. Theoretical analysis, due to its
mathematical constraints and assumptions, is unlikely
to discover design problems or limitations. Compu-
tational research platforms can explore and provide
warnings regarding potential loopholes due to limita-
tions of design, implementation, or regulatory policies.
For instance, electricity production and distribution
systems are already complex adaptive systems that
need to be managed in real time to balance the load
of an electricity grid. Moreover, the electrical energy
market is about to undergo a significant shift in usage
pattern, where a large amount of potential individ-
ual electrical energy consumption coming from elec-
tric vehicles as opposed to just homes and/or offices.
Furthermore, many markets such as electricity mar-
kets are currently undergoing a transition from cen-
trally regulated systems to decentralized but inter-
dependent markets. These transitions are very risky
because we do not have sufficient experience in set-
ting up decentralized energy systems and predicting
their effect on the economy. As mentioned earlier,
lack of appropriate policies can cause major damage
while structurally changing the design and interac-
tions in any complex real-world market. The Califor-
nia energy market debacle and the related collapse
of Enron have demonstrated that the success of com-
petitive electricity markets crucially depends on mar-
ket design, demand response, capacity reserves, finan-
cial risk management, and reliability control along the
electricity supply chain. Similar arguments could be
made about a variety of markets that involve multi-
ple markets at multiple levels with competing inter-
ests that cannot all be simultaneously analyzed in any
mathematically tractable way.
Another interesting factor is in the burgeoning era
of crowdsourcing, or the newly coined term shared-
sourcing. In many emerging smart markets, such as
energy, the line between the traditional roles of pro-
ducers and consumers is already starting to blur, and
so-called prosumers are emerging. In other words, the
consumers of energy can become producers of energy
as new technologies of storing and producing energy
become mainstream. Similar advances in other areas
(e.g., consumer-to-consumer markets) can change the
roles of an entity from transaction to transaction, and
the producers in one instance can become consumers
in another, and vice versa, even for the same under-
lying commodity.
IS researchers have a great opportunity to study
how such potential shifts in the environment affects
the organization and the participants in these mar-
kets. Our belief is that IS researchers, besides arti-
ficial intelligence and economics, should be part of
the community that designs these new competitive
simulation platforms that implement market-based
management structures to study future smart mar-
kets. These platforms will challenge research teams to
create agents, or possibly agent-assisted decision sup-
port systems for human operators, which can operate
effectively and profitably in direct competition with
each other. Research teams with a variety of specific
interests thereby could contribute to the development
of reliable and efficient automation technologies for
efficient trading on the retail and wholesale level.
At the same time, they are challenged to exploit the
structure of the smart market and to design environ-
ments (by iteratively adjusting them) to defeat coun-
terproductive strategic behaviors.
In summary, platforms will allow researchers to
study policy issues in markets at different levels
through the development of competitive, agent-based
automation strategies. These platforms allow com-
plex market structures to be evaluated in a risk-free
environment under a variety of real-world conditions
ranging from normal to extreme. The competitive
design can effectively uncover potential hazards of
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proposed smart market designs in the face of strate-
gic behaviors on the part of the participating agents;
countervailing policies and regulations can thus be
designed more effectively. We next identify and dis-
cuss one of the most intriguing areas of research that
involves studying the dynamics of interaction among
various mechanisms that form the basis of complexity
in a given market domain.
3.1.2. Coordination Among Mechanisms. The
rapid rise of Internet-enabled business interactions
makes the supply chain management domain, like
many other real-world multiechelon problem areas,
increasingly challenging for human decision making.
Besides traditional challenges, such as inventory man-
agement and shop-floor optimization, most of the
supply chain issues currently deal with the coordina-
tion of supply chain operations, including coordina-
tion with suppliers, various functional areas within
the firm, distributors, etc. Because the incentives of
various entities within a firm’s supply chain could
have conflicting goals, coordination usually requires
development of mechanisms that can help align the
incentives appropriately. Given that the evaluation
of these new approaches to decision making is very
difficult in isolation, researchers need to have flex-
ible experimental platforms to study and evaluate
market participants’ relationships in end-to-end sup-
ply chains with various methodologies. Therefore,
the emerging computational platforms should place
a premium on effective coordination of decisions
affecting multiple markets and internal resources.
For instance, in supply chain management, inventory
planning is complicated by the fact that a given part
might be used in multiple products, and a shortage of
a particular part can prevent an agent from participat-
ing in significant segments of the customer market.
IS researchers have much to contribute to this diffi-
cult coordination problem because they can design,
implement, and test different real-world coordination
strategies (Collins et al. 2009, 2010).
3.2. Platform-Based Multiechelon Preferences
The human mind has limited cognitive capacity, so
humans tend to make decisions using rules of thumb,
or heuristics, which stem from their own experi-
ences (Simon 1979). An important area of study is
the design and implementation of (artificially) intel-
ligent agents and decision support tools that can
effectively assist humans with their decision making
efforts (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995), particularly
in information-rich and time-critical environments.
As an example, consider the Dutch Flower Auctions
(DFA), where human decision makers have to bid in
an environment with up to 40 auctions simultane-
ously, where each auction lasts for 3–5 seconds (Kam-
bil and van Heck 1998). Similarly, the amount of data
that must be processed by bidders in widespread
spectrum auction designs in a relatively short time
requires decision support. Furthermore, in multiech-
elon systems the preferences of the same individ-
ual, e.g., price elasticity, might be different in dif-
ferent decision or environmental regimes—for exam-
ple, in situations of oversupply vs. scarcity (Ketter
et al. 2009). Software agents that can mimic human
behavior (or perhaps more efficiently adapt) have
the potential to improve bidder performance signif-
icantly, because they open possibilities for automat-
ing, augmenting, and coordinating decision processes.
These agents can act on behalf of a user with some
degree of independence or autonomy, employing
some representation of the user’s goals and prefer-
ences. Researchers should focus on enhancing the
adaptive learning component of such agents. These
agents could predict the appropriate next steps, help-
ing to speed up and improve the quality of a user’s
overall decision process. Therefore, research is needed
to develop and evaluate highly personalized software
agents that complement the cognitive and computa-
tional capacity of humans, while leveraging the expe-
rience and contextual knowledge of seasoned decision
makers. These agents will collaborate with their users
to gather and present information and recommend
action.
To work effectively and efficiently on all levels
of decision making in multiechelon market environ-
ments, these agents must learn the preferences of
their users with respect to the decision context. Prefer-
ences and their influence on decisions have been stud-
ied extensively in economics and related fields, but
many important problems remain untouched. One of
the big challenges is how to adapt the existing static
representation methods to dynamically model user
preferences in a compact form. This is important for
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fast-evolving domains, such as smart energy markets
or Internet-enabled businesses.
The challenge is that current market design
approaches assume full knowledge of a bidder’s
preferences, but preference elicitation is a formidable
task for several reasons. First, in cooperative envi-
ronments, users face well-documented difficulties
of accurately articulating preferences (Shiv and
Fedorikhin 1999). For example, in combinatorial auc-
tions, bidders would need to know their valuation
for an exponential number of bundles. Experiments
have shown that bidders without tool support eval-
uate and bid on only a small amount of bundles
(Scheffel et al. 2010). This is a significant source of
inefficiency, and much higher efficiency could be
achieved through appropriate decision support. Sec-
ond, even when focusing the users’ attention using
well-established preference elicitation methods, such
methods tend to be cumbersome and give incon-
sistent results. Finally, in competitive environments,
users might not want to divulge their preferences.
Mechanism design theory deals with such questions,
but little is known about incentive compatibility in
repeated and interrelated markets.
Figure 1 presents an agenda that offers numerous
research opportunities for IS researchers in design-
ing intelligent software agents for decision making in
smart markets, and they avoid many of the shortcom-
ings from previous research. We partition the research
agenda into three overlapping phases and suggest
Figure 1 Dynamic Preference Modeling and Decision Recommendation
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novel work in analytical, empirical, and experimen-
tal research in agent-based multiechelon smart market
platforms. To act rationally, the agents must choose
among different actions and means of expression;
to intelligently support the actions of decision mak-
ers, they must understand and respond to the users’
choices. Therefore, the agenda includes historical data
analysis and modeling (Phase 1), autonomous deci-
sion automation including dynamic market and deci-
sion modeling (Phase 2), and agent-assisted real-time
decision support (Phase 3).
Phase 1: Preference model representation and
elicitation. Business decisions represent choices that
combine a variety of observable factors we call market
dynamics with explicit goals and implicit preferences.
These decisions are reflected in transactions. For
example, supply and demand in energy markets are
characterized by a range of exogenous influences,
including daily, weekly, and seasonal demand and
supply variations, as well as weather, fuel price,
political factors, and competitor behaviors. Phase 1
research activities should be concerned with learn-
ing implicit preferences by observing market dynam-
ics and actual transactions and by constructing a
model that can account for these observations (see
Figure 1). Because currently the data, with high vol-
ume and frequency, are significantly ahead of theory,
and a rational agent is trying to process this large
amount of data to maximize the expected utilities,
IS researchers must develop novel statistical methods
Bichler, Gupta, and Ketter: Research Commentary: Designing Smart Markets
Information Systems Research 21(4), pp. 688–699, © 2010 INFORMS 697
and probabilistic machine learning algorithms that
can create insight into existing and future smart mar-
kets. This offers IS researchers exciting opportunities
to develop new theoretical frameworks, such as how
to learn new models of latent behavioral characteris-
tics of the different market participants groups offline,
and perhaps use the results in Phase 2 to dynamically
predict future market regimes and own decisions in
real time. An understanding of customer behavior
through such latent behavioral models can lead to sig-
nificant changes in issues such as product or service
innovation and design, dynamic pricing strategy, and
distribution strategy.
Phase 2: Autonomous model update and decision
support. Many business decisions are made based
not on current conditions but on anticipated future
conditions. Therefore, an effective decision support
agent must be able to identify current and anticipate
future market conditions and update the preferences
of the decision models appropriately (Ketter et al.
2009). IS researchers must acquire advanced skills in
probabilistic modeling so that they are able to develop
new machine learning methods, which in turn are
able to process the huge amounts of data available
and turn it into highly useable information that can be
used by automated decision models. Results from sci-
entific computational platforms, such as the various
Trading Agent Competitions (TAC), have been suc-
cessfully translated in the online advertising indus-
try. Another example is Microsoft’s experimental plat-
form (http://exp-platform.com/default.aspx), which
accelerates innovation through trustworthy experi-
mentation with live users with great success. The
platform enables testing new ideas quickly using the
best-known scientific method for establishing causal-
ity between a feature and its effects: randomized
experimental design. The basic methodology in con-
trolled experiments is to expose a percentage of users
to a new treatment, measure the effect on metrics of
interest, and run statistical tests to determine whether
the differences are statistically significant, thus estab-
lishing causality. There is a great opportunity for
many more smart research platforms like this, because
firms must understand the aggregate evolution of
customer preferences and adjust their decision models
and Web site interfaces accordingly to increase cus-
tomer satisfaction and other KPIs.
Phase 3: Real-time, agent-assisted decision sup-
port. Two problems have and continue to hamper the
adoption of agents in industry (Maes 1994). The first
is competence: to be helpful, an agent must acquire
relevant knowledge and must learn from the user in
what circumstances to make recommendations. The
second is trust: the agent must behave in a way that
inspires trust in its user. A successful agent-based
approach must provide well-grounded suggestions
and leave the human decision maker in final control.
IS researchers should contribute to this research by
designing and developing adaptive learning agents
to assist human decision makers in real-time, multi-
echelon market environments.
If an agent is learning user preferences, it must
not only communicate these predictions to the user
but also must know the extent to which the user
disagrees with its predictions. To address this ques-
tion, computer science researchers typically have used
ad hoc combinations of various parametric and non-
parametric prediction modeling methods to create the
best fit for a given context. However, establishing
a communication paradigm where an agent under-
stands how well its recommendations were received
and how to improve its own performance for a given
user is an open question. For example, should an
agent provide an “optimal” answer given a set of pre-
defined parameters, or should it present a list of alter-
natives that a human decision maker could choose
from? Furthermore, the decisions regarding timeliness
or desirability of a recommendation (i.e., whether or
not the recommendation would be perceived as non-
intrusive) have not been studied much and are sig-
nificant research areas where IS researchers can make
huge contributions, given the IS literature in technol-
ogy acceptance and usage. Finally, adjustable autonomy
(i.e., the degree of autonomy that an agent or auto-
mated decision support system should have) is a com-
pletely open research question, especially in dynamic
and complex market environments where specifica-
tions of a priori optimization constraints are challeng-
ing due to the necessity of subjective decision making.
One of the key virtues of such an agent preference
framework is that these models can be refined via mul-
tiple kinds of feedback. Because the suggested mod-
els are typically probabilistic and capture the relation-
ship between high-level preferences and transaction
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decisions, the preference models can be used to pre-
dict a customized transaction decisions for each user.
Discrepancies between these predictions and actual
choices of users provide a natural error signal for
probabilistic models, which can be used to update
model parameters in real time. The exact methods and
approaches to provide these feedbacks and the com-
putation of errors is in itself challenging and is an
ongoing research area that needs significant attention.
In summary, to make decision in a desired way,
agents not only must understand the consequences
of their actions but also need a policy for choosing
what to recommend to the decision maker. That pol-
icy could consider instantaneous or long-term effects
of choices, but it must have a means of evaluating and
computing these effects. Preferences achieve this and
are the key for agents to make decisions in a ratio-
nal way. Therefore, agents must be able to capture
temporal components of decision makers’ preferences
over time in a nondisruptive, indirect manner and
update them with explicit feedback so that the user
can gain confidence and trust in an agent’s abilities.
For instance, in multi-unit sequential Dutch auctions,
an agent could give iterative recommendations for
an auctioneer to set the starting price and minimum
purchase quantity of each auction, taking various
endogenous (such as bidder population and histori-
cal data) and exogenous (such as news and weather)
information into account.
4. Conclusions
While there have been a number of contributions
on algorithmic mechanism design and optimization
in smart markets in recent years, the experimental
and decision support literature is still in its infancy.
Beyond basic (im)possibility results, the goal is to
achieve satisficing, rather than optimal or fully effi-
cient solutions, by considering cognitive and informa-
tional aspects of market participants.
Overall, we believe that there exists a significant
research opportunity to design smart market mech-
anisms for complex multi-item, multi-unit, and/or
multi-attribute markets using computational tools
and in designing decision support tools for markets
that impose cognitive challenges for humans. While
research on smart markets will continue to be inter-
disciplinary, the traditional IS research areas such as
the design of decision support systems and the mod-
eling of user behavior can play an important role in
solving relevant problems in this domain. The area
provides many opportunities where IS researchers can
contribute in the development of real-world markets
with a significant impact on the market participants
and the economy.
While theory provides central foundations and
boundaries of what is possible, the design of smart
markets requires engineering, decision support, and
experimental work in order to put theory to work. This
is very similar to the way relational algebra provides
a formal foundation for relational databases, but data
engineering comprises many more techniques to pro-
vide robust and efficient database technology. Our
argument is that while trying to model complex envi-
ronments, theory should be used at a much more
granular level to provide guidance for architecture
of platforms rather than at a finer level of granu-
larity such as individual interactions. For example,
Ketter et al. (2009) use the idea of economic regimes to
capture the current and anticipated balance between
supply and demand to define broad guidance for
strategic decisions by an atomic entity. The individ-
ual interactions then emerge and provide the atomic
entity with real-time information to make its tactical
decisions. Furthermore, the research in smart markets
should always take both technological and knowl-
edge maturity into account for long-term evolution
of intelligence in a given market. One danger that
computational platform research can potentially suf-
fer from is the inherent desire of researchers to reap
instant rewards (such as winning in a competition)
as compared to long-term principled approaches that
might provide more sustainable insights. In addition,
behavioral models and empirical analyses are keys to
understanding and evaluating new market designs.
Computational, field, and lab experiments will play a
pivotal role along with formal methods to design effi-
cient markets, which are robust against various types
of speculation and manipulation that we have expe-
rienced it in the past.
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